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The Verification-based Analysis of
Reliable Multicast Protocol
Abstract
Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) is a communication protocol that provides an atomic,
totally ordered, reliable multicast service on top of unreliable IP Multicasting. In this paper,
we develop formal models for RMP using existing automatic verification systems, and
perform verification-based analysis on the formal RMP specifications. We also use the
formal models of RMP specifications to generate a test suite for conformance testing of the
RMP implementation. Throughout the process of RMP development, we follow an
iterative, interactive approach that emphasizes concurrent and parallel progress between
the implementation and verification processes. Through this approach, we incorporate
formal techniques into our development process, promote a common understanding for the
protocol, increase the reliability of our software, and maintain high fidelity between the
specifications of RMP and its implementation.
Intmduaion
Chapter 1 Introduction
Many software engineering papers that discuss software quality begin with a phrase like
"Software is always delivered late, over budget and full of errors." [GANN94] As software
becomes more sophisticated and complex, the task of producing correct, reliable and high-
standard software remains difficult. As computers become cheaper, smaller, and more
powerful, they become more pervasively spread out in modern society and play more
important roles in every aspect of our lives. Since nowadays, most computers axe
interconnected by a network, a failure of software has far more reaching effect. It is clear
that the need for building correct software systems become more demanding.
Formal verification and validation is one effective way to improve the software quality.
Since its creation in 1950s, much progress has been made[GANN94], but the software
industry is still reluctant to accept formal methods. Formal methods are perceived as
impractical and not cost-effective. The reasons for this perception could be many-fold, but
one obvious shortcoming of current practices is the separation of formal verification and
the actual implementation of the software itself. The formal methods can be used to check
the logical consistency and completeness of designs and specifications, but this use has not
been integrated into the entire life-cycle of software development. Formal models of a
design are often developed and then abandoned in the later phases of development. When
change occurs, we have to modify the code and the formal models independently. This not
only increases the cost of development, but also deepen people's impressions about the
limits of formal methods.
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In this paper,we proposea new software development process that integrates formal
methods into the entire life cycle of the software development. In the requirement and
design phases, formal methods serve to model changes of software designs before the
implementation and provide checks for completeness and consistency. During the coding,
however, formal models can be refined along with the implementation of the specifications.
For instance, pragmatic issue such as performance may require design decisions to be
reconsidered. Any problem detected by formal models are fedback to designer and changes
are reflected in the specifications. In parallel, implementation can be modified at the early
stage. In the later life cycle, the same formal models can be used to generate a test suite fox
functional testing of the implementation. Using this approach, we can achieve high fidelity
between the specifications, formal models, and the implementation. We practiced this
process in the development of a complex internet protocol, and we believe that this process
helped us to improve the quality of our software. In our case, we used existing automatic
verification tools to verify the design of the protocol. During the implementation, we
manipulate the models in order to analyze the protocol with respect to the desired
properties. In the later phases, we used the same formal models to generate test cases fox
conformance testing of the protocol independently.
In the next chapter, we first introduce the reliable multicast protocol and describe the way
we use to specify the protocol operations. Then in the Chapter 3, we review existing
verification tools and outline our verification strategies based on these tools. We present
our Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) formal models in Chapter 4. These formal models
are based on different level of abstraction and are developed for different verification tools.
They help us to verify different parts of the specifications by using different levels of
abstraction. In Chapter 5, we discuss test cases generation by the formal models. Finally we
conclude with a short discussion in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2 Reliable Multicast Protocol
2.1 Introduction to RMP
Multicasting is a technique used to pass copics of a single packet to a subnet of all possible
destinations. The Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) is a communication protocol that
provides a totally ordered, reliable, atomic muldcast service on top of an unreliable IP
multieast service. RMP is based on the set of Reliable Broadcast Protocols presented by J.
M. Chang and N. F. Maxemchuk [CHAN84]. RMP is designed to be a transport level
protocol that provides reliable datagram delivery on top of a unicast or multicast unreliable
datagram services. The main goal is to provide high throughput for totally ordered
messages with low latency. It provides a transport mechanism by which the user can design
and implement fully distributed, fault-tolerant applications without the need to deal with
the lower level primitives of communication. Since RMP is aimed at providing a translXm
level service, performance is a very high priority. RMP provides the following features
[MONT94]:
• High throughput for totally ordered messages with low latency
• V'mual Synchrony
• Support of process group models
• Efficient changes to the process group
• Scalability of process groups
• Flexibility of choice for resiliency and fault-tolerance level
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Here, by virtual synchrony, we mean that all sites will receive the same set of messages
before and after a group membership change. In this way, a distributed application can
execute as if its communication was synchronous, when it is actuaUy asynchronous. Our
RMP implementation shows excellent scalability: its single data sender throughput stays
roughly constant as the number of destinations increases. RblP also offers different quality
of services (QoS) levels: from unreliable, totally ordered, majority resilient to totally
resilient.
2.2 RMP operations
RMP is operated in two distinguished modes: a normal operation mode and a recovery
mode. In the normal operation mode, RMP handles delivery of the data packets, token
passing of the token, acknowledgment of data packets and membership changes. The
protocol provides its primary services in the normal operation mode. The protocol switches
from the normal operation mode into the recovery mode whenever a site detects a failure
and triestorecoverfrom thefailure.Afterthe new ringhas been successfullyreformed and
synchronizedtothe same point,the protocoltransitsintothe normal operationmode once
again.
To illustrate the RMP operations, let us see a simple example. Supposed that a RMP token
ring has been formed with three members: A, B and C. Currently, the site B is the token
site. Site A sends a message with sequence number 1 and almost simultaneously site C
sends a message with sequence number 1 as welL Site B sees the site A message just
before the site C message and therefore orders the two message by sending an ACK,
ACK((A, 1), (C, 1), C, 1). The ACK will be placed in the imposed order with a fimesmmp of
1. The dam messages will also be placed in the o_ier with timestamps of 2 and 3. These
timestamps are implied because of the order they are placed in within the ACIL The new
token site is C. If site C does not see any more data within a given time period and it
MolticmaProkx_
EVENT ORDER:
DATA(A,I)
DATA(C, l)
ACK((A, I), (C, 1), C, 1)
AOC(NULL A, I)
LCR(C< Remove, 2)
NL((C,2), B,5)
Impose_i Order.
i ACK((A,D, (C,1),C,D
2 DATA(A, I)
3 DATA(C, I)
4 ACK(NULL A, 4)
5 NL((C_), B, 5)
_ DATA(A, I)
_CK((A,D, (C,D,C,I)
Multicast
Media
LCR(C, Remove, 2)C_
Figure 1. RMP normal operation example
generatesatokenpassalarm and createaNULL ACK with timcstamp 4 and pass thetoken
to siteA. Now sitesC decided thatitwants toremove itselfrom the ring.To perform this
operation,siteC sends an LCR O_,istChange Request)thatcontainsa sequence number of
2, ordering it with respect to the first message from the site C, and requesting site C to be
removed from the ring. Because site A is the current token site, site A generates a new list,
NL((C,2), B, 5), that does not contain site C in it and sends the new list to the ring. As a
consequence of generating the new list, the token is passed to site B. The new list is ordered
within the global ordering by being given a timestamp of 5. The new list that was generated
corresponds with the LCR sent from site C with a SOCl_ number of 2.
The above example explains how the protocol operates in the normal operation mode. If
any site detects a failure during the normal operation mode, it will multicast a recovery start
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packet and all sites switch into the recovery operations after receiving the recovery start
packet. The whole recovery process is a two step process. The first step is the generation
and synchronization of a valid new token list. The second step is the installation of this new
token list at each site. The fault-detecting site will act as a Reform Site and will send out
the Recovery Vote packet to each site member. All other sites will act as slaving sites for
the recovery process and respond to the Recovery Vote packet by sending their votes. Each
site's vote packet contains their highest delivered timestamp, called SynchTSP. The
Reform Site will keep on counting members' votes and sending out new recovery packet if
the certain sites fail to respond within a given time period. After all active site members
sent their votes and all sites synchronize to a common SynchTSP, the Reform Site will
create a valid New List based on the votes collected. Upon receiving New List packet, each
slave site responds with a ACKNL packet and commit the New List in the current token
ring. If the Reform Site receives all ACKNL packets from all members in the New List, the
new ring has been successfully formed and conseqnenfly sends out a NULL ACK packet
to start the rotation of token among the new token ring. During the process of the recovery,
if an error happens or some sites fag to respond within certain time limit or within certain
number of trials, the recovery will be aborted and every site transit into Recovery Abort
state. In this state, each site waits for a random time-out to start a new round of recovery
operation. The overall goal is to provide the best possible reformation of the token ring
upon the failure of certain sites. The more detailed descripdon of the whole recovery
operation can be found in the RMP distribution documents.
2.3 RMP specifications
A complete specification of the protocol contains several parts. Among them are the
description of the service the protocol provides, the assumptions about the environments in
which the protocol is executed, the vocabulary of messages used to implement the protocol,
the format of each message and the procedure rules guarding the consistency of message
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exchanges. The complete set of specifications can be found in the RMP distribution files.
The verification and validation of the protocol is mostly devoted to the design and the
validation of unambiguous sets of _x:edu_ rules governing the exchange of messages and
the operation of the protocol.
Most protocols can be easily described as a state machine. Design criteria can also be
expressed in terms of desirable or undesirable protocol states and state transitions. A finim
state machine is usually specified in the form of a transition table, which contains the
current control state the machine is in, the condition on the environment of the machine
(input signals), the u'ansition effect on the environment (output signals), and the new state.
The protocol is specified using a variant of SCR requirement spccificanon table [HEN80]
that we call mode table. The mode table for RMP specifies the policy that a network site
used to respond to protocol events. Each operation is characterized by the current mode, the
current event and the conditions satisfied by the current state, the transition taken by the
system and the corresponding actions. In a complete RMP specifications, the system can
be in any of the following 12 states: {TS, NTS, GP, PT, JR, LR, NIR, SR, CNL, SV,
ACKNL, AR }. Each RMP site keeps its own three data structures: Data Queue, Ordering
Queue and the Event Queue. Data Queue is a FIFO queue used to hold data packets as they
arrive until they are delivered to application. The Ordering Queue is used for ordering data
packets based on their timestamps. Events axe dequeued from the Event Queues and
serviced according to the specifications. There are 18 different events in RMP
specifications: {DATA, ACK, NACK, CONF, NMD, NMA, NL, LCR, RecStart, RecVote,
RecAbort, Failure, TPA, C'FPA, RTA, MandLv, CommitNI.., JoinReq }. The entire RMP
specification describes the transition and _g actions for a site in any of the 12
states under the 13 different events. Typically, a site's actions include placing the data
packet in the Data Queue, adding ACK packets in the Ordering Queue, updating the
Ordering Queue, passing the token and multicast or unicast certain packets. Here updating
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the Ordering Queue implies identifying the corresponding data packets from the Data
Queue and sending out NACK packets for missing data packets. Another important action
is passing the token. It is taken whenever a site is named as a token site and its ordering
queue is consistent. If the token can he successfully passed, an ACK will he generated and
Multicast to all members. Correspondingly, the token is passed to next site. A positive
acknowledgment policy governs the sending of some packets: the source site will keep on
retransmitfing the packet until certain condition occm_. The details of this policy can be
found in the RMP specifications.
Table 1: RMP Normal Operation Specifications
NTS
NTS
NTS
ACK
ACK
ACK
ACKNTS
Not NamedTS
NamedTS
OrderQ Consistent
Token Passed
NamedTS
OrderQ Consistent
Token Not Passed
NamedTS
OrderQ Inconsistent
PT
"IS
NTS
PT
Add ACK in OrderQ
Update OrderQ
Add ACK in OrderQ
Update OrderQ
PassToken
Add ACK inOrderQ
Update OrderQ
PassToken
Add ACK to OrderQ
Update OrderQ
Table I shows a partofmode tablefortheprotocoloperations.The siteisin theNTS (Not
Token Site) state under the ACK event (the receipt of Acknowledgment packet). If an ACK
event occurs and the site is not named as the next token site, the site will simply put ACK
packet into Ordering Queue, update the Ordering Queue and stays in NTS state. If ACK
packet names the current site as the next token site, the cm-rent site will first put the packet
in the Ordering Queue, update the Ordering Queue, and try to pass the token to the next site.
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If the token is successfully passed and the Ordering Queue is consistent up to the current
time stamp, the site transits to PT (Passing Tokensite) state. If the Ordering Queue is
consistent and the token has not been passed, it transits into TS (Token Site) state. FmaUy,
ff the site is named as the next token site by the ACK packet and the Ordering Queue is not
consistent up to the current time stamp, it transits into GP (Getting Packets) state to wait
for more packets to fill up the missing slots.
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Chapter 3 Verification Strategy and Process Model
3.1 Introduction to protocol verification
A well-structur_ protocol design generally follows two common themes: simplicity and
modularity. Simplicity means that the protocol can be built from a small number of wen-
designed and well-understood pieces. Modularity means that a complex function can be
built from smaller piex_s that interact in a well-defined and simple fashion. Each smaller
piece is a light-weight protocol that can be separately developed, verified, implemented,
and maintained. Generally, a well-formed protocol should have the following
characteristics [HOLZ91]:
• not over-specified: it does not contain any unreachable or inexecutable code;
• not under-specified: it may not cause unspecified receptions during its execu-
tion;
• bounded: it can not overflow known system limits;
• self-stabilizing: ff a transient error arbitrarily changes the protocol state, a self-
stab'dizing protocol always retm'ns to a desirable state within a finite number of
transitions, and resume normal operations;
• self-adapting: it can adapt, for instance, the rate at which data are sent to the rate
at which the data links can transfer them, and to the rate at which the receiver can
consume them;
• robust: it must be prepared to deal appropriately with every feasible action and
with every possible sequence of actions under all possible conditions. The pmt(x_l
11
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should make only minimal assumptions about its environment to avoid dependen-
cies on particular features that could change;
• consistent: three consistency standards include: deadlock-free - no states in
which no further protocol execution is possible; livelock-free- infinite looping
without ever making effective progress; improper terminations - the completion
of a protocol execution without satisfying the proper termination condition.
Since RMP is a complicated protocol, the verification of the protocol design is important
to increase confidence in its reliability and safety during operation. To verify that RMP
specifications have all of the above characteristics is difficult and may even be impossible.
The design of RMP includes many features that directly relate to the above requirements.
Many of these features are borrowed from the experience in implementing TCP. For
example, the recovery mode is designed to satisfy the requirement of self-stabilizing
protocol. RMP time-out and retransmission mechanism applies self-adapting techniques.
Since our concentration is on the RMP operation specifications, the main emphasis of our
verification is on the completeness and consistency of RMP specifications, i.e. proving that
the protocol is well-specified and consistent.
3.2 Verification Methods and Our Early Experience
The current practice of protocol verification can be dividend into two types: mathematical
proofs and model checkers. The mathematical proof approach involves specifying the
protocol assumptions as axioms and proving the protocol properties as a sequence of
lemmas and theorems. It may be a pure mathematical proof or the proof based on the use
of some thexaem provers. Another approach is based on the use of model checkers. In this
12
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case, protocol operations are specifiedin the model checker's formal specification
languages and used as a input to the verification systems. Verifiers then perform an
exhaustive search over all possible state spaces according to the specified protocol
operations. The protocol properties are verified against all possible states and paths.
Currently there are several publicly available theorem provers and model checkers. The
advantages of mathematical proof approaches include its rigorous, precise derivation of
protocol properties, and independence of lower-level implementation. The main
disadvantages of mathematical approaches includes the high-level abstraction that is
separated from the implementation. The lack of traceability between the theorems and
implementation makes it very difficult to find direct correspondence between them. Far the
model checkers, it is more straight forward to translate the protocol operations into the
system-specific specification language and the proven properties can be directly related the
design specification and implementation.
In our first attempt to formally verify the RMP, we used the SMV model checker
[BURC90]. Some initial attempts reveal some limits on this model checker, including the
state explosion problem and the lack of high level data-structure support. We then decided
to use the PVS [RUSH93]. There is a rigorous mathematical proof of the Token Ring
Protocol [CHAN84], on which RMP is loosely based. We then switched our concentration
on the theorem prover approach and tried to replicate the theorem proof by PVS. Because
PVS is a mechanizeA system, most proof steps must be input by the interactive usex. We
didn't pursue along this approach too far, since it is not tractable to implementation. It is
until we found other two model checkers, i.e. Murphi and SPIN, we made some solid
progress in constructing the formal models of RMP. Through this early trial-and-error
approach, we learned that it is very important to construct the formal models at an
appropriate abstract level compatible to the underlying tool's specification language. In the
13
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following sections, we describe the pin.hies of these tools and our experience with them.
We feel that these experiences are very important for directing us to our current success.
Finally we outline our verification strategy and the development process model based on
these available tools.
3.3 Theorem Prover
The mathematical proof approach for formal protocolverificationinvolves specifyingthe
protocol assumptions as axioms and proving the protocol properties as a sequence of
lemmas and _ms. It may be a pure mathematical proof such as the verification of the
Token Ring Protocol [YODA92] or the proof based on the use of some theorem provers
[DREX92]. A typical and popular theorem prover system we have come across and used
in our project is PVS -- Prototype Verification System from Computer Science Lalxratory,
SRI International, Stanford University. It is a prototype for a system specification and
verification based on higher-order logic. It consists of a specification language integrated
with support tools and a theorem prover. PVS tries to provide the mechanization needed to
apply formal methods both rigorously and productively. The primary purpose of PVS is to
provide formal support for conceptualizing and debugging in the early stages of the life-
styles of the design of a hardware or software system, when the executable version of the
system is still not available. PVS has the following features [RUSH93]:
• Early Stage Verification: It is intended to be useful for early life-style applica-
tion of formal methods, instead of program verification of a program in some con-
crete programming language satisfied the specification. It is designed to help in
detection of design errors as well as in the confirmation of"conectness';
• Rich Type System: Compared with some similar systems, it has very rich type-
system and correspondingly rigorous typechecking. A great deal of specification
can be embedded in PVS types, and typechecking can generate proof obligations
that amount to a very strong consistency check on some aspects of the specifica-
14
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tion. It combines a rich expressive specification language and an effective theorem
prover,
• Interactive Proof and Automation: PVS provides a good combination of direct
control by the user for the higher levels of proof development, and the powerful
automation for the lower proofs. It proves the theorem through the process of chal-
lenging specitications. At the high level proof, user can easily input the prove com-
mands, while most lower proofs can be carried out by the powerful theorem
prover,
• Good Conservative Extension: It helps eliminate certain kinds of erro_ by pro-
viding very rich mechanism for conservative extension. PVS provides both the
freedom of axiomatic specification, and the safety of a generous collection of deft-
nitional and conswucfive forms, so that users may choose the style of specification
most appropriate to their problems.
PVS has been used to verify several systems, including fault-tolerating protocol, airline-
reservation system, selected aspects of the control software for NASA's space shuttle
project. It runs on workstation with mediate system resources requirement of disk space
and memory space(30 MB hard disk + 20MB swapping space, > 12 MB memory). PVS is
implemented in Common Lisp. All versions of PVS require Gnu Emacs as its user
interface. Latex and appropriate viewer are needed to support certain optional feature of
PVS, such as the pretty typing of the proof.
RMP is based on Chang's Token Ring Protocol and there is a mathematical proof on the
protocol based on the use of the modal primitive recursive functions [YODA92]. Our first
effort was to replicate the proof by using Paves since, time operators and sequence and
behavior types [RUSH93]. These cons_ types can be used directly to specify RMP
properties. We made some progress in replicating the proof, yet we didn't pursue our
15
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verification of the protocol design using PVS. F',_zst,the learning curve of PVS is very steep
and PVS proof are still mostly mechanic. Even the proof of some simple theonmas can be
quite involved and requires a lot user interactive input. Secondly, we feel that even if we
can formally prove some theorems with the protocol, it is difficult to relate the theorems
with the actual implementation. Since mathematical theorems proved by PVS are generally
at the very high abstract level and there is still significant gap between the implementation
and the theorems. As our primary goal was to integrate formal methods into the software
development proeess and to increase the quality and reliability of the software, we chose to
pursue our verification based on analysis by model checkers whose state-based analysis can
more easily be compare with tests executed on the implementation. A recent report shows
a new implementation of theorem prover which has integrated the model checkers into the
prover system to allow more powerful automatic proof through model checker [RAJA95].
This new system may help to relieve heavy user interaction and lead to shorter proofs.
3.4 Model Checkers
Model checkers use a high-level formal specification as language input and generate code
to perform an exhaustive search over all possible states in order to verify properties of the
specified system. In an effort to facilitat_ the automatic verification of high-level design for
hardware and software systems, several tools have been developed and used in many
applications. We used three tools in the process of verifying RMP: SMV-Symbolic Model
Verifier from Carnegie-Mellon University [BURCg0]; MURPHI from Stanford University
[MELT93] and SPIN from AT&T Bell Laboratories [HOLZgl, HOLZ94]. These tools
have their own features and users can choose appropriate tool to perform different
verification tasks at different levels. In the following subsections, we describe these three
tools and our experience with them.
16
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3.4.1 SMV
SMV is a tool for checking finite state systems, from completely synchronous to
completely asynchronous, against the system specification expressed in the temporal logic
CTL [BURC-X)O]. It allows for specifications of non-determinism and concurrency in its
model SMV attempts to directly model system behavior by specifying state transitions
explicitly for each state variable, expressed as procedures of variable assignments. SMV
has been effectively used in some hardware design verification. It supports rich temporal
logic specifications and an incremental, modular approach to protocol specification and
verification.
We have constructed several simple formal RMP models using SMV. Since our first
attempt involved too much protocol implementation details, we faced severe difficulties in
extending the simple models to include the full protocol specifications. In addition, when
the model is incrementally built, we quickly ram into the problem of state explosion. There
is simply no enough memory to perform exhaustive state space search and extending the
running time does not help. One execution of a SMV mode of RMP was aborted after about
ten days.
3.4.2 Murphi
The Murphi Verification System consists of the Murphi compiler and the Murphi
description language. The Murphi Compiler generates a special purpose verifier in C++
from a Murphi description. After further compiling by C++ compiler, the special p_
verifier can be used to check the properties of the system, such as error assertion, invariant
and deadlock. The Murphi description language is a high-level description language for
finite-state asynchronous concurrent systems. It supports user-defined data types,
procedures, and parameterization of descriptions. A complete Murphi description consists
of declaration of constants, types, global variables, and procedures; a collection of
17
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transition rules; a description of the initial states; and a set of invatiants.
In Murphi, a state is an assignment of values to all of the global variables of the description.
The verifier starts execution in the specified start state. It then applies all executable rules
to this state to generate new states. All visited states and unexplored new states are stored
in two state queues. Whenever a next state is generated by applying a rule to a unexplored
state, it is compared with all visited state.s to see if it a new stare. The execution stops if an
error occurs or if all executable rule.s have been applied to all states and no new state can
be generated.
Because Murphi choose the next executablerulearbitrarilyfrom allapplicablerules, the
Murphi descriptionsare non-deterministic.So the correctMurphi program must do the
rightthingno matterwhich rulesare chosen. This execution model isgood for describing
asynchronous systems where differentprocessesrun atarbitrarySlxcd which interactvia
sharedvariables.Message passingcan be modelled by readingfrom and writingto a buffer
variableor array.
The Murphi verification system can be run in two different modes: simulator mode or
verifier mode. In the simulator mode, the simulator chooses among the rules arbitrarily to
getthe nextstate.Itwillrun foreveror untilan erroroccurs.On theotherhand, the verifier
considerstheresultsforALL possiblechoice eitherby breadth-firstsearchor depth-first
searchprocedures.Itstoresallstatesin a largehash tablesso thatitcan cut off the search
whenever itencountersa stateithas seen before.Explicit"asserf'and "error'"statements
in the Murphi model descriptioncan be checked in each step.Ifone of these conditions
occurs,the verifierhaltsand printa diagnosticconsistingof a rcco_ sequence of
statesthatleads from the initialstateto the error state.All invariantsexpressions arc
checked along allexplored paths. Initially,Murphi was designed for hardware design
18
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verification. It has been successfully used to verify some hardware design as well u some
protocol design, including the design of large cache-coherence protocol (DASH)
[LENO02].
Our first trial on Murphi has the same problem as we had on SMV. The reason is that we
tried to construct a model which involves too much detailed on the protocol operafionL
When we tried to extend out simple model, we faced the same state explosion problem.
Only after we decided to construct our model at a much higher level did we start to get some
real progress in the Murphi model. Our later experience shows that Murphi is a good
verification tool at this level, because it offers the following characteristics:
• Asynchronous State-Machine: Murphi is designed for the verification of asyn-
chronous state-machine;
• One-to-One Rule Translation: Our protocol specifications can be easily wansfer
into Murphi rule specification, which help us to keep high fidelity between our
models and the protocol specifications;
• Invariant and Assertion: Murphi verification system has rich supports for tem-
poral logic invariant specification and insertions of assertion in the specification. It
also support fairness properties specification along the exploration path.
These characteristics are very helpful to our protocol verification. Therefore, we have
performed most of our verification analysis based on our Murphi models of RMP.
3.4.3 SPIN tool
SPIN is a tool for analyzing the logical cons_ and general verification for proving
correctness properties of distributed or concurrent systems, especially for data
communication protocols. The system is described in a modeling language called
PROMELA. The language allows for the dynamic creation of concurrent processes.
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Communication via message channels can be defined to be synchronous (i.e. rendez-vons),
or asynchronous (i.e. buffered). The protocol system is described as a group of processes
running at their own rate, exchanging message through communication channels. Each
process can make state transition based on the state variable values and the channel event
and produce output to other processes' communication channels.
Given a model system specified in PROMELA, SPIN can either perform random
simulations of the systems's execution or it can generate a C program that performs a fast
exhaustive validation of the system state space. During simulations and validations, SPIN
checks for the absence of deadlocks, unshod receptions, and incxccutable code. The
validatorcan alsobe used m verifythe correctnessof system invariantsspecifiedas never
clauses, and it can find non-progress execution cycles.
Compared with the Murphi tool, SPIN has several additional advantages. In-st, SPIN is
especially designed for verification of data communication protocols, and it currently has
over 1000 active users in both academic and industrial world. Secondly, it has the explicit
support for the communication channels between processes, which is good for instantiating
the detailed communication mechanism between RMP processes. Thirdly, SPIN has
adopted some advanced algorithmsto addressthe stateexplosion problem. Users can use
either state reduction algorithm or bit-state reduction to perform best possible search in the
case of state explosion. After we successfully cons_ucted an abstract formal model using
Murphi, we switched m SPIN toincludethedetailedcommunication mechanisms among
differentprocessesand verifytheprotocolatlower levelof detailsthantheMurphi modeL
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3.5 Our Verification Strategy and Process Model
From the above review, we can conclude that theorem provers usually work on a higher
level of abstraction than the model checkers. From PVS, Murphi, to SPIN, they can
simulate protocol operation details in a increased order. In our RMP development project,
our main goal is to increase the quality and reliability of the RMP implementation. As there
is already rigorous mathematical proof of the basic token ring algorithm, it is more
appropriate for us to use model checkers to verify the completeness and consistency of the
protocol specifications. At this point, it is very critical to choose appropriate level of
abstraction to be simulated by the model checkers. Our early trials on these tools gave us
valuable experience in choosing a suitable abstraction level. Our initial attempts on all of
these tools involved too much operation details, perhaps influenced by the RMP
implementation. Only after we determined to use a higher-level abstraction to specify and
simulate the RMP operations, we started to make some real progress in constructing formal
models. While SMV does not support complex data structure, our first model involved
some lower level simulation of the protocol operations, which make it hard to build a
complete model. After that, we decided to use the Murphi tool to build a more abstract
formal model of RMP. At this level, we do not concern about the details of the underlying
data structures. Instead we used non-deterministic algorithms to allow for all possible
transitions. In this way, we built our first Murphi model of RMP. Based on the success of
the first model, we further construct more elaborated interaction model involving lower
level data structures using SPIN's communication channels.
In summary, based on the above existing tools, the event-driven d_gn of RMP protocol
and the mode table specification of RMP, we will perform the verification and validation
in the following two steps:
• Single Site Murphi Model: we use the Murphi tool to construct a single site
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model directly based on the RMP _ons. Each rule in this model will
directly come from the specifications. In this relative high-level model, we are not
concerned about how those events are genesated and how this site's transition is
going to affect other sites. We ate only concerned about the completeness and con-
sistency of the RMP spedficatim of a single site's response m arbitrary events
under an possible states. Basically, we ignore the action part of the specification
but only the transition part. We are only examining a site's behavior under the arbi-
trary sequence of events as specified;
• Multiple Site SPIN Model: we use the SPIN tool to constn_ a multiple-site
interaction model, which will actually model interaction and event generation in
the RMP processes. The explicit commtmication channel feature in SPIN will be
used to simulate the Data Queue, Event Queue and the Ordering Queue in RMP.
Therefore this is a much low level model than in the Murphi model. The state
explosion problem arising fxom the complex interaction between RMP processes
will be handled by the bit-state reduction algorithm.
Since RMP operates in two distinguished modes, ie. the normal operation mode and the
recovery mode, it is appropriate for us to verify two modes separately. In this way, the
essential features of RMP are preserved while the possible state explosion problem is
avoided. This approach significantly reduces the state space as compared to the combined
model, while still maintaining the fidelity. To increase the fidelity between the
implementation and the specifications, these formal models developed are used to generate
a test suite for implementation's conformance testing. So the correct verified protocol
behaviors are tested on the implementation along an possible paths. Consequently the
formal models are fully integrated into the de_ent life'style.
In the entire process of the protocol verificatkm and testing, we followed a iterative and
interactive model of development (Fig. 2). Upon the first outline of RMP specification, we
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start building the formal models using different tools. These models are constructed in a
incremental fashion, i.e. from the simplest normal operation model without dam loss, to a
fully operational modeL Any changes in the design and specification will result in the
modification of the formal models. The formal models provide good testbed for alternative
designs. Any errors detected in the formal models ate fedback to the protocol designers and
the implementation. After the specification and implementation make corresponding
changes, the test cases generated by the formal models are used to test against the
implementation for the protocol conformance. Through these mutual interacdon among the
specifications, the formal models, and the implementation, the high fidelity between the
specification and the implementation can be achieved and the reliability of the software
increases. We feel that this development model incorporate the formal models into the
whole development process and help to improve the software process.
Formal
Formal Models
Specification
Test Generation
Conformance Testing
r Implementation
Figure 2. Our Software Development _ Model
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Chapter 4 Formal Models of RMP
4.1 The Single-Site Murphi Model
As stated in the previous chapter, we first build a single-site model using the Murphi tooL
This singlesitemodel simulatesa singleRMP site'sbehavior under an arbitrarysequence
ofevents.To constructthe model, we simplifyand then extracttheminimal statevariables
from the specifications. Secondly, state transition rules can be built using the transitions in
the RMP specifications. Finatly, we use Murphi tool to perform various verification and
analysis on this formal model, such as deadlock analysis, state assertions and system
invariants.
4.1.1 Some Slmpllficatlons
RMP
Process
Network
Event Generator
Events [
Figure 3. Murphi Model of RMP
For the single site model we do not consider the details of the underlying dam structures
of RMP and any interaction between RMP processes. We simply assume that there is a
network event generator which generates all possible RMP events in an arbitrary sequence
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(Fig. 3). The model simulates the behavior of a RMP site under this event sequence. This
assumption greatly simplifies our model while still provides valuable information on the
completeness and consistency of the transitions in the RMP specifications.
Let us see some of the consequence of this simplifications. First, because we ignore the
interaction between RMP processes and all events are generated by a network event
generator, we need not consider those actions specified in the RMP _ecificatiom. Those
actions only affect other sites, such as the actions of muldcast or unicast packets to other
sites. Second, since there is no concept of data sequence number, timestamp, Data Queue
or Ordering Queue, all necessary conditions in the specifications are simulated by
numeratcd variables and governed by non-deterministic transitions and fairness rules. For
example, theimplementation of an Ordering Queue includesa sequence of slotsorderedby
timestamps. In this simplified model, we do not simulate this data structure directly.
Instead,as the ordering queue can only be in CONSISTENT stateor INCONSISTENT
state, we simply use a scalar variable with two possible values to represent the state of
Ordering Queue. Here a CONSISTENT state means that the site has all slots filled up in its
Ordering Queue up to the last time stamp of the last ACK or NL packet. Since we do not
have theconceptof timestamp atthislevelof abstractioninthemodel, we can not include
detailed fields within data packets and Ordering Queue. Rather, upon receipt of specified
event, this site's state variable is set non-determinisficaUy to either CONSISTENT state or
INCONSISTENT state. In this way, the model is guaranteed to simulate all possible
behavic_'s of the single site under arbitrary events. Third, the system response to certain
events have the same effect on state variables, as we do not consider the underlying
implementation details. For simplicity, we will simply ignore those events and replace
them with the similar events that have the same effect on the state variables. For example,
the model will react in the same manner to member data packets and non-member data
packets. The model keeps the data event and ignore the non-member data event.
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4.1.2 Minimal State Variables
To represent an RMP state, we have to decide which minimal set of variables can
sufficiendy and accurately represent a site's state behavior. Because we do not explicitly
simulate the Data Queue and Ordering Queue, we use some numerated variables to
simulate all state variables. We also have to keep the state variables at minimum to avoid
possible stale explosion problem. Upon examining the RMP specifications, we found that
the following variables are necessary to honestly represent the s13ecificadons:
a. STATE: a variable that represents the operation mode of the RMP site, which
could only be {N'I_ (Not Token Site), TS (Token Site), PT (Passing Tokensile),
GP (Getting Packets), NIR (Not In Ring), JR (Joining Ring), LR (Leaving Ring),
SR (Start Recovery), CNL (Create New List), SV (Sent Vote), ANL (Acked New
List), AR (Abort Recovery)};
b. OQ: a scalar variable to represent the state of the site's Ordering Queue, which
can only be {CSI (Consistent), INCSI (Inconsistent)};
c. TKSTATE: a variable to indicate the token-pass status of a single site. For a
named next token site or the current token site, the site will perform different tran-
sitions based on the token-pass status, i.e., if the token is successfully passed, it
wiU transit to PT, or else stay in the TS. This variable can only assume two possi-
ble values: {TKP (ToKen Passed), TKUP (ToKen UnPassed)};
d. EXIT and TIME: these two variables are used for membership change opera-
fions only. EXIT variable is used to check if the required exit condition is
before the site can actnally leave the token ring. The EXIT variable can only
assume the values of {YES, NO}. The TIME variable is used to represent the rela-
live value of timestamps of different packets, which can only be {GT (Greater
Than),LE (Less or F.quaJ)}.
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Besides these state variables, we also need a way to get additional information from the
data packets. For example, if a site receives an ACK packet, it will react diffe_entiy based
on whether the site is named as the next token _/te or not. Because we do not simulate the
fields within data packets, we need to include this additional information in our modeL For
the normal operation model, we define a _ with two fields in every data packets: one
field called PACKET_TYPE to hold the information about the type of the packet; another
field called PACKET_STATE to hold additional information on packets, such as whether
named this site as the next token site or not. The first field can be any of 13 RMP event
types, and the second field can be {NTS (Named TokenSite), NNTS (Not Named
TokenSite)}.
4.1.3 State Transition Rules and Actions
Even though this single site model is a high-level abstract model, we want to keep high-
fidelity with the specifications as close as possible. Based on the above simplifications, we
achieve this high-fidelity by directly translating each specified transition in the
specifications into a Murphi rule in the model. Each transition in the specifications is
translated into a Murphi transition. In the RMP specifications, however, ff the response to
an event is not specified, by default, it is supposed to be ignored by the site. In Murphi, we
have to explicitly specify this ignorance rule. Otherwise, a deadlock state may occur (see
next section).
For the specified actions associated with each transition, we first cross out those actions that
only affect other sites, such as multicast or unicast of ceratin packets. And then we examine
those actions which will actually change a site's state variables. These actions include: (a)
utxlating Ordering Queue; Co) passing the token. We create two procedures and use the non-
determinisdc algorithm to simulate the possible change of the state variables:
(a) UgxiateOrde_gQueue - whenever a site receives an ACK or NL packet, it puts
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the packet in the Ordering Queue and UlXlate Ordering Queue. This action may non-
determini.stically change the value of OQ variable;
(b) PassToke.n -- whenever a site is in token site (TS) or named as the next token site,
upon receiving a data packet, it will try to pass the token by calling the procedure
PassToketh which may change the value of state variable TKSTATE. Depending on
whether the token is successfuUy passed, the site will take different transitions.
As stated in the RMP specifications, all actions specified are taken before the transition. To
make our model follow this specification, we associate above actions with the event
generator. All actions are taken immcdiamly after the corresponding event is generated.
Then transition rule based on the current state variables are taken. In this way, our model
works in the exact same way as specified. Besides the state transition rules, we also need
rules for event generation. Our first model was restricted to certain sequence of events.
Later analysis shows that this restriction unnecessarily complicates the event generator and
may result in deadlock. Consequently, we remove this constraint and generate all events in
random order.
4.1.4 Deadlock Avoidance
Following the above simplifications and abstraction, it is now straightforward to translate
the RMP specifications into the corresponding Murphi modeL But when we first run the
code generated by the Murphi compiler, it always ran into the deadlock state -- a state
where the system does not know what to do next except staying in the same state. Further
analysis shows that this does not means that there is a deadlock state in the specifications.
Rather, most of time we found that the model does not honestly represent the specified
behavior. The analysis on these deadlock states involves a lot of adjustment and fine-tuning
of the modeL It is also the first step that we get some feedbacks from the model and start
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the iterativc interaction with the protocol designers and implementators. We took the
followingapproaches toremove pessimisticdeadlock statesor perform some analysison
the potential problems in the design:
(a) Event Sequence: Initially, the network event generator produces events according to
some specified sequence. The idea behind that is to simulate the most likely sequences of
events first. As a result of this specified event sequence, the system may easily lead into a
state where the next possible events are not defined, thus in a deadlock state. Later the
model is nmdificd to allow arbitrary sequences of events to be generated, Le. the event after
an ACK event could be any event. While it is good to simulate the most likely sequence of
events hrst and check a site's response under the normal sequence of events, we feel that it
is the value and the advantage of the formal methods to verify that the specified system has
dezdlock-f:_c state under arbitrary event scqueaw.c. By including all possible sequences of
all events, wc arc able to show the completeness of the specifications;
Co) Alternative Operation Between Two Modes: Originally, the model operates in a
completely non-deterministic way. The model simply picks any executable rules and
transits into next new state. In this way, the system may generate several events without
allowing any site response. This is one possible way to simulate the packet loss over the
network, but it also easilyleads into a deadlock state. Since at this abstract level there is
no explicit way to simulate the NACK mechanism in case of data packet loss and we do
simulate the event queue (No event buffering), all data loss are simulated by getting the
corresponding data packets later by the site and bringing the site into CONSISTENT
Ordering Queue state. Therefore we modify the model to operate alternatively in two
modes: event generation mode and site xespoose mode. In event generation mode, a new
event is randomly generated. Since all actions spccificd arc taken before actually transiting
to next state, the corresponding actions are also taken as the next event is generated. In the
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site reSlXmse mode, the RMP site responds to the event based on the current values of the
state variables. In this way, the model works altcmadvely in the event generation mode and
the site response mode;
(c) Event Ignorance Rules: In the RMP specification, all events not specified are
supposed to be ignored by the site. But in the Murphi model, the site response to ALL
events must be explicitly specified, even for those events which are supposed to be silently
ignored. The corresponding "ignore" rule must also be expficidy added into the model to
avoid unknown response deadlock;
(d) Fairness Properties: After all above precautions have been taken, the system may still
get into deadlock state. The key of this problem lies in the fairness properties in the model.
In the actual operation of the protocol, the site will stay most of its time in the normal
operation mode, where the packet loss seldom happens and all lost packets will soon be
retransmitted by the NACK mechanism. But in the verification system, the system
performs an exhaustive search. If there is any possible path which will lead m deadlock or
inconsistent state, it will find it and stay there forever. For example, if a site loses a data
packet and gets into INCONSISTENT state by an ACK event, the lost packet is supposed
to be retransmitted by NACK mechanism. Without further specification, the site may stay
in the inconsistent state forever, eventually violating the system invariant and blocking the
token rotation. The way out is to use the fairness specification to further specify that certain
events should happen infinitely often. For example, the lost data packets will eventually be
reu-ansmitted and bringing the site back to CONSISTENT state again. Otherwise the site
would have to fail and nor further operation is possible. The fairness specifmations play a
important role in this single site model, since we do not have a way to explicitly simulate
the NACK mechanism and dmestamp.
During the evolutionary processing of formal methods, we gradually refined our model to
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a state that honestly represents the specified In'cm:x:ol behaviors and runs deadlock-free. We
feel that it is this part of model tuning process that helps us verify our protocol. Typically,
during the initial debugging and adjustment phase, the Murphi model is run under the
simulation mode so that any deadlock can be easily caught by the simulator and
corresponding change can be made easily. For instance, if the model runs into a deadlock
state and the analysis shows that the system is in a state where the event rcspousc is not
specified. By default, the event is supposed to bc ignored by the site. At this point, the
question goes back to the designers to see ff the site is indeed supposed to ignore the event.
In some cases, the specifications must be modified to achieve the desired behavior.
Sometimes, some adjustments are required to make the model correctly simulate the
specified behavior. Through this kerative feedback from the formal models, we promote a
common understanding of the protocol and increase our confidence on the design and
specifications of RMP.
4.1.5 Verification Analysis and State Invarlants
The Murphi verification system can check other properties beside the deadlocks. To make
sure that the system has certain properties in certain states, we can add explicit "assert" and
"error" statements within a rule. If an error condition occurs, the verifier halts and prints a
diagnostic consisting of a reconstructed seque.m_ of states that leads from the initial state
to the error state. A more general way is to add system invariants into the model so that
these invariants are checked against all explored paths. If the verifier finds that one of the
invariants is false, it will print the detailed path from the initial state to the violating state.
These invariants can be specified in a temporal logic statements. Generally, system
invariants are the best way to verify protocol prolg_es. But the difficulty is that most of
time these invariants are far from trivial To correctly specify a protocol invariant requires
a thorough understanding of the protocoL Here we give two examples of RMP invariants.
The first invariant is called "IS always CSI" - if a site is a token site, then its Ordering
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Queue must be always CONSISTENT. By the definition of the mien site, this property
must be true. If a site's Ordering Queue is INCONSISTENT, it should not become a token
site. Rather, it should first get into GP state and wait until the Ordering Queue becomes
CONSISTENT to transit into TS. After a site becomes token site, there should be no events
with higher timestamp which will put the site into INCONSISTENT state, because the only
packet which has time, stamp greater than the last limestamp is supposed to be generated by
the current token site. Another invariant is called "GP & INCSI always TKUP" - if a site
is in getting packet state and its Ordering Queue is INCONSISTENT, it must not have
passed its token. Only when its Ordering Queue is CONSISTENT, it is possible for the site
to pass token to the next site. These two invariants along with other invariants have been
specified in the model and are verified to be true in our modeL
After continuous manipulation of the model's fairness properties, we found that the
minimum fairness properties required to guarantee all system invariants to be true are: (a)
the token will eventually be passed by a named token site and; (b) a inconsistent Ordering
Queue will eventually become consistent through the NACK mechanism (not simulated by
the single site model). Under these fairness conditions, all system invariants hold. At this
moment, we feel satisfied with the model, since these fairness conditions are just the
minimum conditions in the common sense for the protocol to operate continuously without
getting into recovery state. Of course, more detailed and elaborate invariants will lead to
more detailed check on the system properties. It is worthwhile to mention that besides the
use for exhaustive search, the model can also be used to examine the system behavior under
a specific sequence of events to test an alternative design. We will talk about this later in
the conformance testing part.
The above discussion is restricted to the normal operation modeL The recovery model can
he consorted in a similar way. For state variables, we need another variable ALL to
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represent vote and ack information for RecoveryVote or AckNewList. Besides, we also
need more fields to represent information in a data packet:
• INFO- if the packet information matches with the site's infimnation;
• LIST_ if the new fist is valid of invalid (according to the pre-specified fanlt-
resilient criteria);
• RFM -- ff the list is the reformation list or not.
Most of these variable are binary variables. In this way, a recovery model is constructed
and used to perform ve_on analysis. When fairness conditions are minimized, we
found that for most recovery states there is only one way to recover successfuL This strict
requhement is compensated by the RMP's flexible design to allow for the creation of a
single site's own group.
4.2 Multiple-Site SPIN Model
4.2.1 The Need for Multiple-Site Model
In the Murphi formal models, we examine the protocol behavior of a single site under
arbitrary sequence of events. At this level of protocol abstraction, there is no concept of
packet sequence number, fimestamp, Data Queue, Ordering Queue or HACK mechanism.
There is no explicit interaction between different members of the RMP processes and all
event-generating action parts are ignored. All events are generated by a network driver in
a non-deterministic manuez, not by the ring member as part of the site's response action. In
the models, all actions that only affect other sites states are ignored. The Murphi model is
good for checking the completeness and consis_ of the RMP specification related to
the stale transitions. The verification analysis on this level of abswaction shows that the
protocol does preserve the required properties under the arbitrary sequence of events,
assuming that certain fairness properties are satisfied. A complete verification of the
protocol specifications requires us to consider interactions among different sites and all
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events should be generated as part of mcmbc_"s specified resIxmse action instead of being
generated by the external random event _.
Based on the above observations, we decided to take the advantage of SPIN tool's explicit
support of commurdcation channels [HOll91]. We develop a SPIN formal model of RMP
which incorporates the interactions between token ring members and elaborate the
communication mechanisms between different sites. As we need to simulate the action
parts of sending out data packets, ACK and NACK packets, we have to include the concept
of sequence number, dmestamp, Data Queue and Ordering Queue. Therefore, the SPIN
model must have lower level simulation of the protocol operations and include some basic
underlying data structures. For example, in the Murphi models, we simply use a non-
deterministic algorithm to simulate the transition of a site's Ordering Queue between
CONSISTENT and INCONSISTENT state. In the SPIN models, whether a site's Ordering
Queue is consistent or not will be determined completely by examining the slots of the data
structme in the site's Ordering Queue. Since we have to maintain some data structures to
represent a site's state, this detailed model permits a closer comparison between the formal
models and the implementation.
4.2.2 Some Simplifications
Since RMP is a complicated protocol, it is neither necessary nor possible to use the SPIN
tool to simulate all detailed behaviors in the protocol implementation. We have to make
some simplifications for our model to abstract the main features of the protocol without
getting into too overwhelm in details. In our model, we explicitly make the following
simplifications:
• Fixed single data source: In the RMP specification, data packets can be sent to
the token ring by any ring membe_ or by other non-member sources. Allowing
multiple data source will not introduce any operational complexity but simply
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make the book-keeping task more complex and difficult;
* One ACK per data packet: For efficiency reaum, the current RMP specification
and implementation support one ACK for multiple data packets, which is an exten-
sion of Chang's original token ring protocol [CHANS1]. But this expansion is
strictly for the efficiency reasons and does not involve any fundamental change to
the _1 operation. So inour model, we willkeep theoriginalone ack per data
packet poficy. Since our data source continuously send out data packets, there will
not be any NULL ACK packetsinthe normal Ol_On model;
• Small periodic sequence number/timestamp: In the RMP stccificadon_ the
data sequence number is source specific and could be any number determined by
tim source. These sequence numbers arc used to determine the relative order for
the data packets sent out by the same source. The timesmmp is used to order all
data packets from different sources and forms the base of virtual synchrony. The
dm_p is monotonically increased by each ACK ca"NL packets until (2^32 - 1).
It is then round back to zero and increases again. If we allow the dmestamp to
change in a large range, the mutual interaction between different sites will cause a
state explosion. Since we have to keep our data _s simple and the number
of state variables small, it is essential to have a good algorithm to represent the
timestamp and the sequence number. From the above simplifications, we can use
the same number for the data sequence number and the dmestamp, since thee is
only one data source and no NULL ACK packet. The critical step is that we use a
small periodic sequenceJdmesmmp that ranges from 0 to (2*N-l) to simulate the
finite states in the Ordering Queue. Here we have to used the following factto
update and periodically clear each site's Ordering Queue: whenever the token is
rotated back to a site, the site can discard all data packets prior to the last times-
tamp sent out by this site and clear those slots for later use;
• Three site interaction model: More members in the ring will increase complex-
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ity of the protocol operations, but three members will represent almost all possible
combinations of events and states possible in the interaction. To keep our model
simple, we retain to three site interacdon model. Actually, there is no intrinsic dif-
ficulty in instandating more RMP processes in SPIN, since processes can be cre-
ated dynamically. But more prtges.w_ will require longer Ordering Queue and
more complex book-keeping,
• Strict flow control: In the protocol design, flow control is a very complicated
and important issue, especially when NACK policy is implemented. A good flow
control algorithm should allow for the fastest data transmission without unneces-
sary duplicate data retransmission. To avoid unnecessary complication in our for-
mal model, we use a strict flow control mechanism that the data source will not
send the next data packet until it receives the acknowledgment for the last sent
packeL To construct a formal model with the realistic time-outYretransmission
algorithm involves much more nontrivial work.
Based on the above simplification, the formal RMP SPIN models axe built in an
incremental fashion. First, a model with no data packet loss is constructed, where the data
source initially sends out a data packet and each site reacts as specified in the protocol
specification. This model mainly consist two basic processes: a muldcaster process that
plays the role of network mulficasting network and a RMP process that generate events and
responds to the events on its own event queue. The data source will not send the next packet
until it receives the acknowledgment for the last packeL All mulficast packets (DATA,
ACK) axe muldcast to all members through a multicaster process. Unicast packet are scat
directly to the destination data queues. We use arrays of size (2*N) to record the data
packets and ordering queue slots. Different from the RMP implementation, all data packets
will stay in the data queue and will never be actually placed in the ordering queue, since we
have the same sequenceJfimestamp. Each process loops infinitely on its event queue: get
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next event from the event queue, take actions and transit as specified in the specifications.
Whenever there is a system-wide time-out, it is assumed that the last packets are lost by all
members and will be retransmitted. After this first model is constng'¢_ a more detailed
model with data lose and NACK and retransmission mechanism is constructed.
4.2.3 Results
Even from the simplest version of SPIN model of RMP, we can learn something beyond
our first intuition. Since all packets in the first model are transmitted reliably, we naively
assumed that each site would always have their Ordering Queue in the OONSISTENT sta_
and will never get into INCONSISTENT stag. Consequently, all sites would never get into
GP state - a state that was named as the next token site, but its Ordering Queue was in
inconsistent state such that it can not accept the token immediately. But the first run of the
model shows that even in this reliable defivery case, it is still possible to get into GP state
temporarily. Due to the response speed differences among different sites, the data packets
may be delivered out of order. In the case where the ACK packet is delivered ahead of the
corresponding data packet, the site may be temporarily in the GP state. This is the
advantage of the automatic verification tool: even for a simple model it can exhibit you
some non-trivial behaviors.
The next level of the model involves the simulation of network behavio¢. Since RMP is
built on top of UDP, packets may be lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order. For the
current RMP specifications, the duplicated packets should not cause any specific problems.
The mis-ordengldelivery of data packets is simulated automatically by the SPIN system by
considering all possible different rates among different processes. So the main task is how
to simulate data loss and the re_ mechanism. While it is easy to simulam data
loss, the model may easily get into deadlock state without careful consideration. If the
packet is missed by all members in the ring, the data source will be waiting for
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acknowledgmentfor the dam packet while the current token site, which is responsible for
generating the acknowledgment packet for the lost data packet, is waiting for the data
packet.to arrive. In the implementation, this problem is solved by setting a alarm for the
token site to pass the token within certain time limit. Witt_n this limit, if no dam l_tcke_
arrives, the token site will pass the token by a NULL ACK packck In our _ we use thc
global time-out feature in SPIN to retransmit the lost peckec whenever thee is a system-
wide time-out and the system is in s deadlock state, the last (lost) packet is re-multicasted
to all members in the ring.
As inthe Murphi model, we firstrun the model ina simulationmode. The simulationruns
can be usefulinquicklydebugging new designs,butthe simulationdoes not prove thatthe
system iserrorfree.In the simulationmode, ifthereis any errorchecked by the assert
statementor system deadlock, one can easilydebug the code. All visitedstatesare not
stored,but interpretand execute statementson thefly.GcncraUy, we use thismode under
two cascs.In thefirstcase,iftheSPIN model isnewly constructed,thesimulationhelpsus
quickly debug the modeL In the second case,the model is too complicated to take an
exhaustivesearchon allpossiblestates,a long timesimulationmay help to gain coverage
in wade of time.
After the formal model is established in a bug-free state, a verification code is generated to
perform an exhaustive validation. The first type of validation the SPIN model can perform
is the teachability analysis. This includes checking the state properties and system
invariants, such as the assertion violation, and detecting the error assertions. All of these
tasks can be easily done by examining all possible states. The second type of analysis is the
detection of deadlock. To distinguish the normal termination from the deadlock, the
acceptable end states are marked by end labels. The third type of analysis is bad cycles
detection, including non-progress cycles and livelocks. Some systems may not have
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deadlock state, but they may loop infinitely without making "real progress". Here "_u
progress" means passing some states with desired properties. You can place progress labels
in the SPIN model to indicate some desired progress states. For example, in the RMP
normal operation, we want the token to be rotated around all members and all sites will be
in token site state (TS) infinitely often. We can mark the statement with its state in "IS as
the progress state. If the token can be implicitly passed without explicitly transiting into TS
state, the situation will be more complicated. Similarly, to formalize the opposite of the
non-progress cycles that something bad can not happen infinitely often, one uses the accept
labels. The last type of validation analysis is through temporal logic claims. In PROMELA,
all temporal claims are expressed as never clauses, e.g. in a way that something as specified
should never happen in the protocol It is relatively hard to express some complicated
temporal claims in never clauses, but the new release of SPIN has an additional option to
translate the linear temporal logic specifications into never clauses.
If an error is found, you can run the verifier again with -t flag to follow the full error uaiL
SPIN has several command options to change the default settings of the state space search,
including maximum search depth, and hash table entries. An important feature of SPIN is
that it provides feasible analysis in case of state explosion. A order analysis shows that most
computers with16-32 MB memory will run out of space for a system about 10_5 states
[HO1-7.91]. For models with multiple process interaction, this limit can easily be reached.
In this case, an exhaustive search is impossible. Besides random simulation, SPIN often a
bit-state supertrace algorithm to perform best possible partial-search. Some analysis shows
that this algorithm is by far the best in the case of impossible exhaustive search.
4.2.4 Future Directions
We have successful constructed a SPIN model for normal RMP operations and carried out
various validation analysis on the model We did not find any major problems, but the
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model does l_lp us to _ the complication of d_ protocol. For the ILMP recovery
opm'afion, wc still fac_ some difficulty in cW_iendy simulated various alarms and fime-ou_
mechanisms. In RMP, alarms play an imlx_ant role in reu_nsmission. We have to find •
way to simulaw these alarms and ren-ansmission algorithms effectively before we can
further improve our models. We believe that SPIN has enough power to perform a good
validation analysis on RMP.
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Chapter 5 Test Cases Generation
5.1 Conformance Testing and Testing Strategy
The development of RMP follows our iterative model: a full interaction between
development team and the verification team. Upon the first design finished, the
development team moved forward to implement the protocol design in C++ and the
verification team starts working on the formal models based on the specifications. Any
potential problems found in the verification process are fedback to the design and
development team and may result in the modification of the specifications and the
implementation. Upon the completion of the first RMP implementation, the conformance
testing of the implementation becomes the main task for the verification team. A white-box
testing would be good if there is enough resomees and time. Considering the large size of
our implementation (> 2,2000 lines of code) and the group size of our team (2 for design
and implementation, 2 for testing and verification), we resort to the code review and black-
box testing. Code review is good to find some apparent and developer's habitual coding
errors, and black-box testing will serve the conformance testing. Since black-box testing is
based on the testing of all roq.bed functions, it is also known as functional testing.
Since the high fidelity between the specifications, the formal models, and the
implementation is our goal, we will perform the minimal functional-testing for the
implementation as our first step. All operational transitions specified in the specificatiom
are under testing to make sure that the imple_nentation has the desired behavior. Since RMP
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is a distributed commtmicanon protocol, we have to find a way to do testing for this kind
of distribuwd system. Fortunately, the implementawrs of RMP has designed and coded the
implementation of RMP with testability in mind and has built in a lot of conditional
compiling codes to facilitate the testing. The_ include some operation like dumping the
contents of Ordering Queue and Data Queue, assertions about the current state variables.
Actually, based on these additional code, • small testscript language is created to facilitate
the testscript generation. The conformance testing of RMP is based on this testscript
framework [MORR95].
5.2 Test script genermion
Since we adopt a functional testing strategy, the test suite generated has to cover all
specified transitions in the specifications. Our formal models perform verification by
examining all states and along all possible paths. That means, all possible combinations of
the transition paths and the all states are ah'eady explored by the verification system. We
may simply use the explored states and paths as our testing suite. Along this fine, all
required test cases for the functional testing are already explored by the formal models, the
problem is how to extract this information out from the formal models and the verification
system.
Under our testscript framework, tests are executed in a single RMP process. Instead of
using explicit network communication, the testscript framework allows us to input any data
packets and insert some failure conditions. This approach is very similar to the single tim
Murphi model: we are examining a single site's behavior again the specifications under all
possible events. Therefore a test suite is ge_emwd based on the Murphi models.
Our first intent was to modify the Murphi system to output our test suite directly with
cerl_in option flags. We examined the class hierarchy in the Murphi source code and
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intended to add some command flags to generate test suite. The Murphi system consists of
a complex class hiera_hy and the work can not be done through the modification of a single
class. At the same time, we observed that the Murphi system supports a verbose output
option, by which the system produces verbose every step as it progresses. Hence we
decided that instead of changing the Murphi system directly, we would run the verifier in
verbose mode and direct the output into a file. We build • tool to extract the test s_ttite out
from this file. To extract the explored paths fTom the Murphi verifier's output, we use a text
extraction language called Perl. Perl is a powerful language for text extraction and report
writing. We reconstruct all explored paths and produce • test suite in our _ format.
This is a more efficient way to produce test suite.
We wrote a program to extract the test cases from the Murphi output. Vtrst, two arrays are
consu'ucted to establish the correspondence between the Murphi state number and the
values of state variables. As Murphi performs the search on all possible states, it
increasingly assigns an unique integer to any new state. Secondly, the entire searching tree
is reconstructed based on the verbose output of Murphi verification system. This produces
a nonuniform tree: some states may have only one direct child, while others states may have
sevend children. The entire tree structure is stored in an array of lists. Each array element
contains a list of states which are direct descendents of the current state. Finally, all
explored paths are outputted as test cases by left-most search on the state tree. As tests are
generated, the visited paths are removed from the state tree. This process continues until
the _ate tree becomes empty. For the test output, we follow the SCR requirement table
format and specify the test paths as the current state, the event, the conditions on state
variablea and the next state. This provides a direct input to Jeff's automatic test scripts
gen_amr tool [MORI_SI.
For the normal operation model, we start from the Not_InRing or Not_Token_Site state
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and examines all possible transitions according to the s13ecificafions. 291 different paths arc
generated for normal operations only. In Appendix lI, wc list the test suite generated this
tool for the normal operation model without member change extension. It has total of 63
paths. Similar method is applied to n_,ova'y model and 250 test cases are generated.
5.3 Discussion
Up to now, a complete transition cover testing has been performed on the RMP
implementation. But this test suite does not consider the difference between different state
variable cooditions. A complete functional testing should consider the state mode along
with the different values of other state variables. Therefore, the transition cover testing has
fewer test cases than the test cases generated by the Murphi. In our formal models, we
separate the normal operation model from the recovery operation model. If we merge them
together, the entire test set will significantly increase, since the test cases grow
multiplicatively, instead of addifively. The current testing on transition mainly concerns
about the new state by verifying an assertion on the state mode, no other variables are being
verified. Because testing is performed on a single RMP process, all actions to other sites
are left untested. To include the testing on other variables as well as actions, more test cases
need to be executed and the testseript firamework need to be modified to support more
assertions.
Besides providing the full functional coverage test cases, the formal model can also be used
to explore the implementation behavior of RMP by generating the test paths under
particular sequences of events. For example, if the behavior of the system under a certain
sequences of events is suspected, we can generate the testing paths using the formal models
to guide the testing of the implementation under this special sequence.
44
Chapter 6 Conclusion
Based on the formal specifications of RMP, we have cotmructed formal models of RMP at
two different levels and perform verification analysis on the protocol. The automatic
verification systems provide the completeness and consistency check on the protocoL
Through formal analysis, we promote our understanding of the protocol and increase
confidence on the protocol design. Furthermore, during the whole verification and testing
process, we followed an interactive development model between the implementation and
the verification which helps enhance the fidelity between the specifications, formal models
and the implementation. The formal analysis results are directly related to the
implementation through our test suite generation tool based on the verification outt_
During the process of formal analysis of RMP, we learned that the critical step for this
approach is to construct the formal models at an appropriate level of abstraction. The
abstraction level should be suitable for the formal specification support of the underlying
verification systems. At the same time, the coordination and corporation between the
implementation team and verification team is another important factor to this approach. In
a large software development environment, this factor will become even severe. At this
point, we still can not say that we have formally verified RMP. By incorporating the formal
methods into our development cycles, we have increased our confidence on the design and
the quality of the implementation. We believe that more detailed works can be doze and
closer comparison with implcmentation can be achieved.
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Appendix
L Part of RMP Specifications
Events in the RMP specification are one of several things. (1) Arriving packets, (2)
Expired alarms, (3) User events, (4) Exceptional conditions. The specification event types
are"
Event Type
Data
ACK
NACK
cone
NMD
NMA
NL
LCR
RecStart
RecVote
RecACKNL
RecAbort
Failure
TPA
CTPA
RTA
MandLv
commitNL
JoinReq
Description
Data Packet
ACK Packet
ACK Packet
Confirm Packet
Non-Member Data Packet
Non-Member ACK Packet
New List Packet
List Change Request Packet
Recovery Start Packet
Recovery Vote Packet
Recovery ACK New List Packet
Recovery Abort Packet
Retransmission timcout on packet
Token Pass Alarm
Confirm Token Pass Alarm
Random Tinaeout Alarm
Mandatory Leave Alarm
Commit New List Notification
Application request to join group
Smtes:
TS
NTS
GP
PT
JR
LR
NIR
SR
CNL
SV
ACKN
Token Site State
Not Token Site State
Getting Packets State
Passing Token State
Joining Ring State
Leaving Ring State
Not In Ring State
Start Recovery Stare
Created New List State
Sent Vote State
ACK New List Stare
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AR Abort Recovery State
Token Site State Table:
Event Condition(s) Smm
Data Token Passed PT
Dam !Token l_sed 'IS
NMD Token Passed PT
NMD !Token Passed
LCR Token Passed PT
LCR Token Passed "IS
ACK Named Token "IS
NL Named Token TS
Failure (none) SR
RecStart (none) SV
TPA (none) PT
CTPA (none) "IS
Action(s)
placepacket in DataQ
Pass-Token
place packet in DataQ
Pass-Token
place packet in DataQ
Pass-Token
"IS place packet in DataQ
Pass-Token
pLaccpacket inDataQ
Pass-Token
place packet in DataQ
Pass-Token
Unicast Confirm to
Site Source
Unicast Confirm to
Site Source
Mulficast RecStart
Unicast RecVote to
Reform Site
Generate Null ACK
MulticastNull ACK
UnicastConfirm to
lastToken Site
Passing Token State Table:
Event Condition(s) Stare
Data (none) PT
NMD (none) 171"
IXX (none) Fr
NL !named Token Site NTS
NL named Token Site PT
OrderingQ consistent
Token passed
NL named Token Site TS
Action(s)
place packet in DataQ
Update-OrderingQ
place packet in DataQ
Update-Ord=ingQ
place packet in DataQ
Update-OrdertngQ
Add NL to OrderingQ
Ulx_e43rd_gQ
Add m. to OrderingQ
Upda=-OrdemgQ
Pass-Token
Add NL toOrderingQ
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NL
ACK
ACK
ACK
ACK
Conf"
Failure
RccStart
OrdcringQ consistent
_To_n pared
named Token Site GP
!OrdcringQ consistent
!named Token Site NTS
named Token Site PT
OrdcringQ consistent
Tokenpassed
named Token Site "IS
(kdefingQ consistent
!Token passed
named Token Site GP
!OrderingQ consistent
Ttmestamp _ NTS
Last token pass
Ttmestamp
(none) SR
(none) SV
Not Token Site State Table
Event
Data
NMD
LCR
NL
NL
Updsz-OrderingQ
Pass-Token
Add NL toOrderingQ
U_laa_O_k_mgQ
Add ACK m OrdcdngQ
NL
Upd_c_XdcrmsQ
Add ACK to OrdcringQ
ul_e.or, kz'tngQ
Pass -Token
AddA(X to OrdcringQ
Ulxtas_C_IcmgQ
ass-Token
Add ACK to OrderingQ
NL
ACK
ACK
ACK
Coition(s)
(none)
(none)
none)
!named Token Site
Stale
NTS
NTS
NTS
NTS
PTnamed Token Site
OrderingQ consistent
Tokenpassed
named Token Site "IS
OrderingQ consistent
]Token passed
named Token Site GP
!OtdcringQ consistent
!named Token Site NTS
u_gQ
Upda_43rde_gQ
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Multicast RecStart
Unicast RecVote to
Reform Site
Action(s)
placepacketin DataQ
Updaz43rdcringQ
placepacketin DataQ
u_gQ
placepacket inDataQ
Updaz-OrdcrtngQ
Add NL to OrderingQ
Updaz43rderingQ
Add NL to OrdcringQ
Upda_43_dcrtngQ
Pass-Tok_
AddNLto OrderingQ
U_gQ
Pass-Token
Add NL to OrdcringQ
named Token Site PT
OrdcringQ consistent
Token passed
named Token Site TS
Upda_43_k_gQ
Add AC_ to OrdcringQ
Updsz-Of_gQ
Add ACK to OrdcringQ
U_-OrdcrmgQ
Pass -Tokca
Add ACK to OrderingQ
ACK
Failure
RecStart
C0mmitNL
OrdetingQ omsistent
!Totenptmed
named Token Site GP
!OrderingQ consistent
(none) SR
(none) SV
NL does not contain LR
u_gQ
Pass-Tok_
Add ACK toOrderingQ
u_te-ontemgQ
MulticastRecStart
UnicaszRecVote to
Reform Site
Schedule MandLv
site
Getting Packets State Table
Event Condition(s) State Action(s)
Data OrdetingQ consistent PT
Token passed
Data OrdcringQ consistent TS
!Token passed
Dam !OrderingQ consistentGP
NMD OrdcringQ consistcm PT
Token passed
NMD OrderingQ consistent TS
!Token passed
NMD !OrderingQ consistcntGP
LCR (none) GP
ACK OtderingQ consistent PT
Token passed
ACK OrderingQ consistent TS
!Token passed
ACK !OMeringQ consistrmtGP
NL OrderingQ consistent
Tokenpa,aed
NL OrderingQ consistent "IS
!Token passed
NL !OrderingQ consistentGP
place packet in DataQ
ulxme-orde_gQ
Pass-Token
place packet in DataQ
uMate-Orde_gQ
Pass -Token
place packet in DataQ
Update-OrdertngQ
place packet in DataQ
Update-OrdemgQ
Pass -Token
place packet in DataQ
Update-OrdertngQ
Pass-Token
place packet in EMtaQ
Update-OrdemgQ
place packet in DataQ
UMate-OrdemgQ
Add ACK to OrderinsQ
Update-OrdertngQ
Pass-Token
Add ACK to OrderingQ
Upda_-OrdemgQ
Pass-Token
Add ACK toOrdcringQ
Upda__gQ
Add NL toOrderingQ
UIzlate-OrdemgQ
Pass-Token
Add NL to(kdcringQ
Update-OrdcrtngQ
Pass-Token
Add NL to OrdcringQ
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Failure (none) SR
Re_tart (none) SV
Ul   rd, gQ
Multica_ RecStart
Unicast R(_:Votc to
Reform Site
IL Test Suite Generated for RMP Normal Operations
Path 1:1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 8
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> NTS
Path 2:1 -> 2 -> 4 -> 9 -> 13 -> 36
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ _ ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> NTS
NTS @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
Path 3:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 14 -> 37
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> TS
TS @ TPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ TPA ) -> PT
Path 4:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 15 -> 38
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> TS
TS @ CTPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ CTPA ) --> TS
Path 5:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 16
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI A TKUP A DATA ) ->
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) --> "IS
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP A DATA )
Path 6:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 17
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> TS
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )
Path 7:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 47 -> 62
biTS @ DATA when ( CSI A TIGJP A DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> TS
"IS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> TS
TS @ TPA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ TPA ) -> PT
Path 8:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 48 -> 63
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
52
NTS@ ACK when(CSI^TKUP^ACK) ->TS
TS@ ACK when(CSIATKUP^ACK) ->TS
TS@ CTPA when(CSI^TKUP^CWPA) ->TS
Path 9: I -> 2 -> 5 -> I0 -> 18 -> 41 -> 49
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK) ->TS
TS@ ACK when(CSIATKUpAACK) ->TS
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )
Path 10:1 -> 2 -> 5 -> 10 -> 18 -> 41 -> 50
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK) ->TS
TS@ ACK whe_(CSIATKUP^ACK) ->TS
TS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )
Path 11:1 -> 2->5-> 10-> 19
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> TS
TS@ ACK when(CSI ^TKUPAACK)
Path 12:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 20 -> 42 -> 51 -> 66
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TICUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT@ CFM when ( CSI ^ TKtJP ^ CFM) -'> NTS
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
Path 13:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 21
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )
Path 14:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 22
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK) ->PT
PT@ ACK when (CSI ^TKUP^ACK)
Path 15:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 23
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ _ ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT@ ACK when (INCSI ^TICUP^ ACK)
Path 16:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 24
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when (CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK) ->pT
PT @ ACK whelt ( C SI ^ TKUP ^ ACK)
53
Path17:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 52
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TIUJP A DATA ) -> N'I'S
NTS@ ACK when(CSI^TKP^ACK)->PT
PT@ ACK when ( CSI^ TKP ^ ACK ) ->PT
PT @ CFM when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ CFM )
Path 18:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 53 -> 67
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> Fr
PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA ) -> PT
Path 19:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 54
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TIU.JP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT@ ACK when(CSIATKpAACK)->PT
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )
Path 20:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 55
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS@ ACK when(CSIATKP^ACK)->PT
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )
Path 21:1 -> 2 -> 6 -> 11 -> 25 -> 43 -> 56
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TIGJP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKP ^ ACK )
Path 22:1 -> 2 o> 6 -> 11 -> 26
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK)
Path 23:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 27 -> 44
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> GP
Path 24:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 28
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )
54
Path 25:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 29
bITS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
N'rs @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )
Path 26:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 30
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TIG.JP ^ ACK )
Path 27:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 31 -> 45 -> 57 -> 68
bITS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> FT
FT @ CFNI when ( CSI ^ TICUP ^ (2F'M) ->NTS
Path 28:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 31 -> 45 -> 58
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TIG3P ^ DATA ) -> NTS
bITS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ ACK ) -> PT
PT @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )
Path 29:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 59 -> 69
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
N'I'S @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> GP
Path 30:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 60
bITS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA )
Path 31:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 32 -> 46 -> 61
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKP ^ DATA )
Path 32:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 33
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP ^ DATA) -> NTS
NTS@ ACK when(INCSI^TKUP^ACK) ->GP
GP@ ACK when (CSI^TKUP^AC K)
Path 33:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 34
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NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TIGJP ^ DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP@ACK when(CSI^TKpAACK)
Path 34:1 -> 2 -> 7 -> 12 -> 35
NTS @ DATA when ( CSI ^ TKUP A DATA ) -> NTS
NTS @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK ) -> GP
GP @ ACK when ( INCSI ^ TKUP ^ ACK )
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